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Peter van Inwagen’s essay, “Causation and the Mental,” offers a strik-
ing solution to Jaegwon Kim’s puzzle for non-reductive materialists about 
mental events/states and mental causation: the solution, reminiscent of 
van Inwagen’s solution in Material Beings to certain puzzles surround-
ing constitution/composition, is that there are no such things as events or 
causation, and a fortiori no such things as mental events or mental causa-
tion, and hence nothing that can raise any puzzle. (More precisely, the 
claim is that causation, and a fortiori, mental causation, is never instanti-
ated.) This is no ad hoc reply, but rather a consequence of van Inwagen’s 
very general ontological claim that everything is either a substance or a 
relation; thus, there are no events and no causation, since the latter is a 
relation that holds between events if it holds at all. (Van Inwagen does 
not deny that there are true causal explanations, but the truth of these, 
he argues, does not require that there are any events.) Van Inwagen has 
demonstrated one advantage of denying the existence of events, namely 
that doing so allows one to avoid a certain puzzle one might otherwise 
have to confront. I suppose that could be taken as a reason to deny the 
existence of events. Even if it is such a reason, it has to be weighed against 
all the difficulties involved in such a denial. In any case, van Inwagen’s 
ambitions are more modest: he is merely noting that Kim’s puzzle pre-
supposes an ontology that one need not endorse, and that van Inwagen 
rejects on independent grounds.
The volume is rounded out by two other pieces: an excellent editorial 
introduction and a moving and informative appreciation of Plantinga’s 
philosophical contributions, delivered by his long-time friend and col-
league, Nicholas Wolterstorff. The former provides an overarching 
framework for the volume, and the latter drives home the significance of 
Plantinga’s achievements, especially for those of us who weren’t around 
in the “balmy days of positivism.” All in all, this high-caliber volume is a 
fitting tribute to one of our greatest philosophers.
Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, by William Hasker. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013. 269 pages. $99.00 (cloth)
DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University
William Hasker writes: “The ‘three-in-oneness’ problem of the Trinity is 
really hard” (162). I couldn’t agree more. Appropriately for a treatise on 
that problem, Hasker divides his attempt at a solution into three parts: 
Trinitarian Foundations, Trinitarian Options, and Trinitarian Construction. 
Throughout, Hasker pushes something he calls “Social Trinitarianism.” 
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Part I selectively skims the Fathers on the Trinity, focusing on Gregory of 
Nyssa, Augustine, and a couple of other “pro-Nicenes.” Part II critiques 
Barth, Rahner, Moltmann, Zizioulas, Leftow, van Inwagen, Brower and 
Rea, Craig, Swinburne, and Yandell. Notably, in Chapters 15 and 16, 
Hasker affirms absolute identity as the only relation whereby anyone can 
count anything.
I expect that most readers of this journal will be most interested in Part 
III, where Hasker develops his own syncretistic metaphysics of the Trinity, 
drawing mainly on Leftow and Craig. Chapter 21, on methodology, tells 
us that he aims to theorize about “the divine three-in-oneness” so that 
he can “bring us a step closer to comprehending that mysterious reality” 
(167). Such theorizing requires some constraints, however, chiefly “accept-
ing the language of trinitarian belief with its limitations,” “in particular its 
analogical character” (170). This implies, he says, that we should “exercise 
restraint in our attempts to formalize this language” and in our use of it 
“in the construction of systematic deductive arguments” (170).
Hasker is right. It is wise to treat analogical trinitarian discourse as 
analogical, and so it is wise to exercise restraint with respect to it in these 
ways. However, we must not forget a corollary to this sage piece of ad-
vice: it is foolish to treat non-analogical trinitarian discourse as analogical, 
including the statements of a metaphysical theory aimed at solving the 
three-in-one-ness problem. Imagine meeting a metaphysician who insists 
that we count only by absolute identity and who gives a metaphysical 
theory aimed at solving the three-in-one-ness problem. Suppose we find 
among its statements these three: there is exactly one divine being, there 
are exactly three divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, 
and there is exactly one way to be divine. I would think that, no matter 
what other learned erudition and metaphysical bells and whistles attends 
the theory, we should construct a systematic deductive argument to show 
that these statements entail a contradiction. If the author complains that 
we’re taking them strictly and literally when she intended them analogi-
cally, we should counsel her to find another job, one more suitable to her 
aspirations, e.g., trinitarian narrative, poetry, or liturgy, all worthy tasks. 
Metaphysicians have a different task to perform and a different standard 
to live up to in its performance: to state the cold, sober truth, and to do so 
strictly and literally, in a rigorous, scrupulously well-defined fashion.
Chapter 22, ostensibly about monotheism, summarizes some of Larry 
Hurtado’s views regarding the early church’s “binitarian practice.” Chap-
ter 23 insists that each Person is God, where “is God” is used as an adjec-
tive to predicate divinity or deity, not identity. Chapter 24 says that each 
Person is a person, where by “x is a person” Hasker means “x is a center or 
subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action” (193, 196–198; 
see also 22n15, 256, and Chapter 3 passim). Chapter 25 describes the com-
munion of the Persons while Chapter 26 defends the eternal generation 
of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Hasker recognizes that 
communion, generation, and procession cannot suffice for the needed 
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“oneness” in an adequate solution to the three-in-oneness problem. For 
that, we discover in Chapter 27, we need Hasker’s core view, which we 
might naturally call
Core. “the three Persons share a single concrete nature, a single trope 
of deity” (227).
Since, according to Hasker, it is “highly plausible” to “equate” the divine 
nature/trope with the “divine mind/soul” (236, 243), and since on page 257 
he adds “a single mental substance” to the equation as well, he “models” 
(257) his core view in these words, although the label is mine:
Support. The divine nature/trope or divine mind/soul or single men-
tal substance “support[s] simultaneously three distinct lives, the lives 
belonging to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit” (236, my 
emphasis).
He defends Support’s “conceptual coherence” with split-brain and mul-
tiple personality data (231–236).
As Chapter 28 begins, Hasker expresses satisfaction with his “strong 
case” for the coherence of his first model, but he shouldn’t. That’s be-
cause, among other things, few of his peers, if any, will understand what 
he means by “support.” At some level, he is aware of the problem since 
he seeks “a more precise account of the relationship between the persons 
and the divine nature than is provided by the loosely defined ‘support’ 
relation” (237). However, the problem is more acute than Hasker acknowl-
edges since nowhere does he define it. He says only that “the term is used 
in the ordinary sense in which we can say that the human body/mind/
soul . . . ‘supports’ the continuing conscious life of a human being” (228). 
This is no definition, not even a “loose” one; nor is there any such thing 
as “the ordinary sense” of the term “supports” that is used to say that 
“the human body/mind/soul supports the continuing conscious life of a 
human being.” Thus, the primary explanatory relation posited by the first 
model is an explanatory surd.
Fortunately, he ditches “the support relation,” replacing it with the 
transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive constitution relation (245), which he 
initially defines in such a way that x constitutes y only if x is spatially coin-
cident with y and it is possible for x to exist without y, two implications he 
wants to avoid for theological reasons, along with another. The final defi-
nition, which the reader must piece together for herself (241–243), is this:
x constitutes y at time t if and only if
(i) x is absolutely distinct from y;
(ii) x and y have all their parts in common at t;
(iii) x is in G-favorable circumstances at t;
(iv) necessarily, for any x, if x is of primary kind F at t and x is in G-
favorable circumstances at t, then there is a y such that y is of pri-
mary kind G at t and y has all of its parts in common with x at t;
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(v) it is (conceptually, but not necessarily metaphysically) possible 
for x to exist at t but for there to be no y at t that has all of its parts 
in common with x.
Hasker tells us that (ii) “should suffice to secure the needed ‘closeness’ be-
tween x and y” that had been secured by spatial coincidence in the initial 
definition, and that “if, as is commonly thought, souls are metaphysically 
simple, then neither x nor y will have ‘proper parts’; what they share, 
then, will be only their single ‘improper part,’ which is the soul in its en-
tirety” (243).
Hasker clarifies two concepts in his definition: primary kind and G-
favorable circumstances. The primary kind of a thing, he says, supplies the 
answer to the question, “What most fundamentally is it”? Hasker has no 
theory of primary kinds but, quoting Lynne Rudder Baker, on whom he 
relies heavily, he says that “If x constitutes y, then y has whole classes 
of causal properties that x would not have had if x had not constituted 
anything” (240). For example, “a cat has innumerable causal properties 
that would not be possessed by a heap of cat tissue, were that heap not 
to constitute a cat” (240). The G-favorable circumstances are “precisely the 
circumstances in which an object [x] of primary kind F must find itself at 
a given time in order to constitute an object of kind G at that time,” where 
the circumstances may include features either intrinsic or extrinsic to x 
(241). For example, if x is of the primary kind mass of cat tissue and y is of 
the primary kind felis catus and x constitutes y, then x “does so in virtue of 
certain circumstances in which x finds itself; lacking those circumstances, 
x might [conceptually “might”] exist without constituting anything” (241).
Hasker then applies his definition to the subject matter of the book. For 
F in the schema, he tells us to substitute divine mind/soul or concrete divine 
nature/trope or single mental substance; for G, substitute divine trinitarian per-
son; and for G-favorable circumstances, substitute “when [the divine mind/
soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance] sustains 
simultaneously three divine life-streams, each life-stream including cognitive, 
affective, and volitional states” (243, his emphasis). He continues: “Since 
in fact [the divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single 
mental substance] does sustain three life-streams simultaneously, there are 
exactly three divine persons” (243, my emphasis). Thus we have Hasker’s 
second model, which we might label
Sustain. The divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single 
mental substance constitutes each of the Father, and the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit when it “sustains simultaneously three divine life-streams, each 
life-stream including cognitive, affective, and volitional states.”
Hasker beams: “all is as it should be” (243). But clearly: not all is as it 
should be. Among other things, “sustains” is at least as undefined as 
“supports,” and so the critical G-favorable circumstances under which the 
divine mind/soul, etc. is supposed to constitute each of the Persons are 
simply unintelligible.
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We might well wonder where God is in all this. Chapter 29 answers 
with a “grammar of the Trinity” that specifies “three different and distinc-
tive uses of this word [“God”] in the vicinity of trinitarian doctrine” (246): 
(i) to refer to “Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament, who was known to 
Jesus as Father” (246–247), (ii) to predicate divinity or deity of each of the 
Persons (247–249), and (iii) to refer to “the Trinity as a whole” (249–250), 
which, according to Hasker, is absolutely identical with either a composite 
object distinct from the Persons who are its proper parts (144, 198, 243), or 
a maximally tight-knit “community of persons” (196, 249, 258). Chapter 30 
summarizes the book in three pages.
Aside from my concerns about the intelligibility of “supports” and 
“sustains,” I have several other concerns. For example, what is it, exactly, 
that does the constituting? The options on offer—(i) divine mind/soul, (ii) 
concrete divine nature or trope, and (iii) single mental substance—do not 
fall into the same category, despite Hasker’s “equation,” and the models 
may well have different implications, some welcome, some not, depend-
ing on which we opt for. Another example: for each option, when it satis-
fies Hasker’s conditions for constituting something else, how is it, exactly, 
that the result is a person, as opposed to, say, a personality? A third: even 
if the result is a person, what is it about the constituter in virtue of which 
a constituted Person is divine? For, on the one hand, if the constituter is 
itself omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc., and if it is 
distinct from each of the constituted Persons, each of whom is distinct 
from the other and also omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncre-
ated, etc., don’t we have four divine beings on our inventory? On the other 
hand, if the constituter is itself neither omnipotent, omniscient, morally 
perfect, nor uncreated, etc., then, even if it does “support” or “sustain” 
a stream of “cognitive, affective, and volitional states,” thereby resulting 
in a constituted Person, in virtue of what, exactly, is that Person omnipo-
tent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc.? A fourth concern: if 
one constituted divine Person is absolutely distinct from a second con-
stituted divine Person, then there are at least two divine Persons. But if 
there are at least two divine Persons, why aren’t there at least two divine 
beings? So what if there’s just one trope of divinity. On Hasker’s view, we 
don’t count divine beings by tropes; we count them by absolute identity. 
Thus, wouldn’t a count of two divine persons also be a count of two di-
vine beings? A fifth concern: why aren’t there three numerically distinct 
Persons that are qualitatively indistinguishable? What is it about (a) the 
constituting mind/soul/nature/trope/substance, or (b) the three distinct 
life-streams of “cognitive, affective, and volitional states,” or (c) the for-
mer’s supporting or sustaining the latter, in virtue of which each consti-
tuted Person is qualitatively different from each other constituted Person? 
Presumably, the answer lies in some qualitative difference in the distinct 
life-streams of mental states, which pushes the question back a step: why 
aren’t there three numerically distinct life-streams of qualitatively in-
distinguishable mental states? What is it about (a), (b), and (c) in virtue 
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of which each life-stream is qualitatively distinguished from each other 
life-stream?
Unfortunately, space does not permit me to pursue these concerns. 
Rather, let me draw the reader’s attention to another concern, one that 
begins with a simple question: what is monotheism? Whatever else we 
might say in answer to this question, surely we can agree on this much:
1. Monotheism implies that there is only one God.
There are not two Gods, three Gods, or four Gods. There is just one God, 
exactly one. In this connection, note that “God” is used as a count noun 
by monotheists, a use screechingly absent from Hasker’s list of three per-
mitted uses (246–250), a use only grudgingly acknowledged in a footnote 
as “consistent” with his three (251n6). Christians should be clear with 
Hasker: There are not three Gods. There is only one God. Two statements more 
integral to the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be found and both use “God” 
as a count noun.
We might pause to inquire into the nature of this being exactly one of 
which exists, according to monotheism. The monotheist will answer that 
a God—with an honorific capital “G” befitting its referent—is the kind 
of thing that instantiates the divine nature. As is well known, monothe-
ists disagree about what properties that nature involves, but let’s suppose 
Hasker is right: it involves omnipotence or almightiness, omniscience, 
moral perfection, uncreatedness, etc. (247, 256). Thus, given our supposi-
tion, a God is omnipotent or almighty, omniscient, morally perfect, uncre-
ated, etc.
Back to the main thread, a little logic tells us two things:
2. Necessarily, if there is only one God, then there is at least one God.
3. Necessarily, if there is at least one God, then there is a God.
It follows that
4. Monotheism implies that there is a God (from 1–3).
Some Christians hesitate when they see or hear “a God” in discussions 
such as ours. That’s unfortunate. For, like it or not, monotheists—and 
Christians too, for every Christian is a monotheist—have a God on their 
hands, and a magnificent God at that, a God worthy of our total devotion. 
So much for monotheism; now let’s turn to Hasker.
According to Hasker, “it is entirely unacceptable to describe each—or 
indeed any—of the trinitarian Persons as ‘a God’” (190). That’s because—
given his philosophical commitments, which are optional for trinitarians—
if he deemed it acceptable, then he would have to say: “If each Person is 
‘a God,’ and each is distinct from each other Person, then we have at least 
three Gods” (190). So, to avoid three Gods, Hasker insists that
5. The Father is not a God, the Son is not a God, and the Holy Spirit is 
not a God.
But, according to Hasker,
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6. God is not a person,
since God—whether a composite or community of the Persons—is not a 
subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action, and so fails to 
satisfy Hasker’s definition of “x is a person.” Furthermore, since nothing 
can instantiate the divine nature, and thereby know, will, love, act, and 
exhibit consciousness unless it is a person, it follows that
7. Necessarily, for any x, if x is a God, then x is a person.
Therefore, on Hasker’s view,
8. God is not a God (from 6 and 7),
and thus
9. Neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, nor God is a 
God (from 5 and 8).
But we Christians affirm that
10. Necessarily, if there is a God, then the Father, the Son, the Holy Spir-
it, or God is a God.
That’s because, by our lights, no one else could possibly fit the bill; not 
Beelzebub, not Balaam, not Beelzebul, not Barabbas, not anyone. It follows 
that, on Hasker’s view,
11. It is false that there is a God (from 9 and 10).
Thus, we arrive at the denial of monotheism (from 4 and 11).
How will Hasker respond to this argument?
Well, if the past reliably indicates the future, he will first denunciate 
me for defining “monotheism” so that it is incompatible with the doctrine 
of the Trinity (as he does on page 198). But I’ve done no such thing, not 
least because I haven’t defined anything. I have stated that monotheism 
implies that there is only one God—a statement Hasker says he believes: 
“If it can’t be maintained that there is only one God, then the claim to be 
monotheistic will have to be given up” (195)—and I have deduced that 
there is a God from that statement by deploying two logical truths (2 and 
3). Moreover, I have accurately represented the relevant portion of Hask-
er’s trinitarianism (5 and 6) and I have expressed a necessary truth and 
the mind of Christians (7 and 10); otherwise, I have drawn demonstrably 
valid inferences in the logical system that Hasker himself endorses.
Second, he will declare me a unitarian (as he does on page 198). But 
I have said nothing that implies that “God is a single person,” a claim 
Hasker misattributes to me four times (145, 197, 198, 230), as though a 
monotheistic once or even a trinitarian thrice were not enough. By my 
lights, a freighter filled with philosophy sits between the trinitarian “God 
is a person” and the unitarian “God is a single person,” philosophy that’s 
optional for Christians, and so we must not simply assume that anyone 
who affirms the former must affirm the latter.
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Third, he will decry my “tendency to treat classic theological texts and 
expressions as if they were formulas in symbolic logic” (as he does on 
page 197). Here, I’m afraid, Hasker has some explaining to do. For in the 
study of mine to which he refers, I treat Bill Craig’s work on the Trinity. As 
for my “formulas in symbolic logic,” I plead guilty as charged. My only 
defense is that I thought we were doing analytic theology.
On a more serious note, we can access the substantive issue on pages 
196–198—which is whether or not God is a person and thus can, inter alia, 
perform intentional acts—through a little argument:
12. God = the Trinity.
13. The Trinity never performs intentional acts.
14. So, God never performs intentional acts. (from 12 and 13)
Hasker bristles at (14), but how can he deny it? After all, he repeatedly af-
firms (12), where what, by his lights, is rigidly designated by the singular 
terms flanking “=” fails to answer to his own definition of “x is a person.” 
Moreover, the argument is formally valid given Leibniz’s Law, which he 
also affirms. That leaves (13). What should we say about it? Hasker tells us 
that we should say two things:
(i) The Trinity performs intentional acts in the way in which “groups of 
agents . . . are said to perform intentional acts in virtue of such acts 
being performed by their members,”
and
(ii) The Trinity performs intentional acts, alright; but when we use those 
words, we use them analogically, not strictly and literally (197).
As for (i), we might well ask: should we say “groups of agents perform 
intentional acts in virtue of such acts being performed by their members” 
because that sentence is true, strictly and literally? If Hasker answers “yes,” 
then we rightly expect him to illuminate us on how it is, exactly, that a 
group of agents, whether a composite or community, performs an inten-
tional act, strictly and literally, in virtue of its members performing it, de-
spite the fact that, strictly and literally, it fails to satisfy his definition of “x 
is a person,” and so, strictly and literally, it cannot intend anything. And, 
of course, we need more than that. For in the case of God (= the Trinity), 
we also rightly expect Hasker to illuminate us on how, exactly, a group 
of persons, whether a composite or community, can, strictly and literally, 
perceive, know, desire, love, and be conscious, even though, strictly and 
literally, it is not the subject of perception, knowledge, desire, love and 
consciousness. Hasker, however, attempts no such illumination. I take this 
to be sufficient evidence of the fact that he forsakes any account of the 
truth of (i), spoken strictly and literally. So either (i) is off the table, or it 
collapses into (ii).
As for (ii), he says that, although “groups of agents . . . are said to per-
form intentional acts,” they do not strictly and literally perform intentional 
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acts; rather a group of agents is merely “regarded in some contexts, and 
spoken of, as if it were a single person,” and so a group of agents is merely 
“regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it” performed intentional 
acts, as if it had properties that only persons can have (249). The same goes 
for the Trinity—that is, God. “[T]he Trinity [= God], while not literally a 
person, can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if 
it were a single person,” and so the Trinity, that is, God, while strictly and 
literally incapable of performing intentional acts and strictly and literally 
incapable of perceiving, knowing, desiring, loving, and being conscious, 
can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it were 
capable of performing intentional acts, as if it were the subject of percep-
tion, knowledge, desire, love and consciousness (249).
Let’s dwell on this for a moment. According to Hasker, when we speak 
strictly and literally, as metaphysicians aim to speak, God never created 
anything; nor does God know anything, will anything, or love anyone; nor 
is God conscious. Indeed, Hasker goes so far as to assert—with italicized 
passion—that “God cannot refer to himself [sic?], or be referred to (‘strictly and 
literally’) by others, using personal pronouns” (231). So, God is not a person 
even in Peter van Inwagen’s minimal sense of the term (122n4). God lacks 
a point of view.
I propose that we find a pithy way to capture Hasker’s position on this 
matter. Let “x is a Chalmers zombie” mean, by definition, “x lacks con-
sciousness”; and let “x is a Nagel zombie” mean, by definition, “x lacks 
a point of view.” Then Hasker’s God is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. But at 
least a Chalmers-Nagel zombie can perceive, believe, desire, will, and act. 
Not so Hasker’s God. Hasker’s God is much, much worse off mentally 
than a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. Let “x is a Hasker zombie” mean, by defi-
nition, “x is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie and x otherwise lacks mentality.” 
Then it is more accurate to say that Hasker’s God is a Hasker zombie. Not 
a Hollywood zombie, not a Haitian zombie. A Hasker zombie.
So God is a Hasker zombie. Nevertheless, Hasker reassures us, it is 
still “more accurate” to speak as if God is a person, as if it can perform 
intentional acts, as if it knows, wills, loves, exhibits consciousness, and 
has a point of view. For, after all, writes Hasker, consider the alternative: 
“Would it be more accurate to describe the Trinity [= God] as powerless? 
When in fact the three Persons together exercise a single, transcendent 
power that can never be in conflict with itself? Or that the Trinity [= God] 
is ignorant, when each of the three Persons knows everything that exists 
to be known?” (249) Good question: would it? Hasker wants us to answer 
“No, it would not; it would be more accurate to describe God as omnipo-
tent and omniscient than powerless and ignorant.” But, as we’ve seen, 
on his view, God [= the Trinity] really is a Hasker zombie, in which case it 
would be much more accurate to describe God as powerless and ignorant 
than as omnipotent and omniscient.
How could Hasker be so wrong about the implications of his view? My 
hypothesis is that he does not have in mind accuracy simpliciter, where a 
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statement is accurate simpliciter if and only if what it claims to be the case 
really is the case. My hypothesis is that he has in mind another sort of ac-
curacy, what we might call “as-ifery accuracy.” If my hypothesis is correct, 
then we need to know, exactly, what this quality is and we need a metric 
for non-arbitrarily assigning more or less of it to statements. Only then can 
we begin to understand how it can be that it is more as-ifery accurate to de-
scribe God as omnipotent and omniscient instead of powerless and igno-
rant when we know for a fact that it is more accurate simpliciter to describe 
God as powerless and ignorant instead of omnipotent and omniscient.
Christian analytic theology is a wonderful enterprise. For, among other 
things, Christian analytic theologians allow us to see more starkly than 
ever what is at stake in our different attempts to understand the great 
doctrines of the Church. This is certainly true of William Hasker’s meta-
physics of the Trinity. As I come away from my study of his book, two 
questions loom large for me. First, are we Christian analytic theologians 
going to follow the one we profess as our Lord and stand up and count 
ourselves as full-blooded monotheists, insisting that our metaphysics, 
logic, and philosophy more generally get in line with our profession? 
Yes, it is difficult to define “monotheism”; but we don’t need a definition 
to know that whatever else monotheism involves, it implies that there is 
only one God, and so it implies that there is a God. Second, is it morally 
permissible for Christian analytic theologians—or Christian intellectuals 
and leaders more generally—to adopt as-ifery in their most fundamental 
theorizing about the nature of God? We might approach the second ques-
tion through reflection on the Church’s mission, no small part of which is 
expressed by the Great Commission. In this connection, let me phrase the 
question in a conspicuously evangelical way: can we Christians in good 
faith evangelize with “God loves you and offers a wonderful plan for your 
life” when we think it would be more accurate simpliciter to say “God does 
not love you and offers no plan for your life, much less a wonderful one. 
But don’t take it personally. God can’t love or offer anything to anyone”?
Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract 
Objects, ed. Paul M. Gould. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. 209 
pages. $25.99 (paperback)
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Are you the sort of philosopher who prefers desert landscapes, or lush 
forests? Would you gladly live in a world that contained the Platonic 
heavens, or would you rather decry the heavens and do without? Where 
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